be a gerrymandered entity that encompassed Fichte's initial exposition and the newly opened territory of Schelling's Naturphilosophie. The personal situation between our two philosophers was delicate: Fichte and Schelling, who considered themselves friends and philosophical allies, had more or less promised to keep their differences private and talk through their difficulties.
1

Did Schelling Misunderstand Fichte's Transcendental Method?
Michael Vater
Marquette University
The Fichte-Schelling Correspondence interweaves intriguing personal stories and philosophical combat. One of the sadder personal stories involves Schelling getting wind of Fichte's remark to Friedrich Schlegel that he did not understand transcendental method. The letters document several clumsy attempts by Fichte to minimize the criticism, 1 only to have it surface again in a letter Fichte wrote to a former student, Jean Baptiste Schad, who showed the letter to Schelling. 2 In it, Fichte claimed that Schelling understood Wissenschaftslehre no better than Friedrich Nicolai, whom Fichte had publicly excoriated for critiquing as 'I-philosophy' a superficial assemblage of random quotes from mixed sources. -For months before this end of the cover-up Fichte and Schelling were engaged in a struggle over whether there were one or many Wissenschaftslehres, or if one, it had the empty universality of logic, or if many, it could be a gerrymandered entity that encompassed Fichte's initial exposition and the newly opened territory of Schelling's Naturphilosophie. The personal situation between our two philosophers was delicate: Fichte and Schelling, who considered themselves friends and philosophical allies, had more or less promised to keep their differences private and talk through their difficulties.
Each had the habit of furnishing the other with recent publications, though neither put much effort into reading them. The letters they exchanged, while not casually composed, served not so much to solidify a common position as to project personal visions of each individual's own completed system. They have the intense quality of the discussions about-to-be-former partners have before calling in the lawyers. Indeed, the Schad letter ended the relationship.
My concern, however, is not tabloid history, but the truth of Fichte's assertion that there was something called 'transcendental method,' that he understood it, and that Schelling--as evidenced by the appearance of the System of Transcendental Idealism and subsequent writings--did not. We can point to three phases in each thinker's ideas of philosophical system and method in the years 1794 to 1802/03. An exact side by side comparison of positions is not possible, since each evolved following its own logic and in somewhat willful ignorance of the other's:
Schelling retained the memory of the first two parts of the 1794 Foundations as his referent for 'Wissenschaftslehre' and seems not to have noticed the 1797-1798 Attempt at a New Presentation. Having confronted Schelling's early dalliance with realism in that work's Second Introduction, 3 Fichte ignored Schelling's first attempts at fashioning a philosophy of nature, and was dismayed to discover a deduction of nature as the theoretical part of Schelling's 1800
'System of Idealism'. While it will take a detailed exploration to uncover the truth of the claim The 1794 Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre employs the language of "abstraction" and the philosopher's free "reflection" to motivate the acceptance of the Grundsätze which are laid out at the beginning of the theoretical philosophy. Consciousness is founded in an absolute Tatsache that is presumed by all states of empirical consciousness, but not found among them; the philosopher thinks his way to this primal ground through abstracting reflection (GA I/2: 254). In the ensuing train of reflection, the philosopher comes upon the primitive form of the law of identity, the I = I, which expresses what will later be called intellectual intuition: "One cannot think anything without additionally thinking one's I as selfconscious; one can never abstract from one's self-consciousness." Only by assuming a genetic account of this primitive Tatsache can a system of idealism be achieved, and it will be expressed approximately as: "The I originally and simply posits its own being" (GA I/2: 259). A similar line of reflection establishes the other two fundamental principles, whose postulation is grounded in an examination of the more empirically accessible acts of consciousness examined in the work's third part, the account of intelligence as praxis, founded on striving, feeling, and drive.
The background for Fichte's 1794 reflections on method is Spinoza's concept of determination or determinate negation and Kant's the famous question about the justification of synthetic a priori judgments. The first two fundamental principles, the I's positing of itself and its positing of a not-I opposed to itself, lead to the third: the I posits itself as divided, or a divisible I posits itself in opposition to a divisible not-I. If one abstracts from specific content,
we have here the principle of divisibility, the ground of divisibility and conjunction for all further determination in reflection (GA I/2: 272). Divisibility is thus the ground of both "antithetic" (or If one can describe the 1794 Grundlage as historical-and-reflective in the way it established its Grundsätze and analytic-and-synthetic in its exposition of the details of the knot of determinacy and freedom that is the I's reality, the New Attempt is experiential or experimental in its foundation and even more explicitly synthetic-and-analytic in its exposition.
The First Introduction lays out the key elements: The finite rational being is or has nothing but its experience, and it is equally a thinking and an observing of thinking. Kant argued, rational cognition through concepts, in contrast to mathematics, which is rational cognition through intuitions. 10 Indeed if there is cognition via intuitions in mathematics and geometry, there must be a cognition of this cognition, a mathesis of mathesis. Philosophy can be independent of concepts, including a static and ready-made concept of philosophy, if and only if it is "the cognition of reason itself by means of itself." Only on the condition of being a living self-cognition is philosophy entitled to undertake the task of critiquing reason-extending, criticizing, justifying, and ultimately correcting cognition.
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Wissenschaftslehre is mathematics, claims Fichte, and because it is rational cognition in intuition it has the self-evidence and universal validity of the postulates and theorems of mathematics. It shares three marks with the mathematical sciences: immediate self-evidence, complete determinacy (no matter what signs or symbols are chosen to convey its content), and irrefutability. 12 The terms Fichte uses in this discussion (intuition or intellectual intuition) carry the same performative sense they did in 1797. He does not employ Kant's term construction here as he does in the New Version itself, but the term aptly designates a method which is transparently certain because it is active or self-directing, and self-correcting because it is selfaware. 13 8
There is little in the way of historical reflection in the New Version, but under the subheading 'Historical Narrative', Fichte looks back at earlier formulas that summarize the core of his thought: Wissenschaftslehre discovers that thinking apprehends itself as self-reverting thinking or it experiences its own activity as agility. 14 These are both formulations of Kant's great discovery, in fact "his only lucid thought," that immediate self-consciousness is the necessary condition of every other state of consciousness. 15 Fichte agonizes over whether this proposition is a postulate or a theorem. It is not a postulate in the sense of an arbitrary or provisional assumption, though it will carry self-evidence with it once it has been proved. Nor is it a theorem in the sense of something proved by means of concepts. But since it is proved in intuition (or construction), it is more akin to the latter than the former. 16 The real hallmarks of this intuitive procedure are that: (1) it is free of received meanings, even the conventional reference of terms, (2) a free production of all the facts of consciousness, (3) it resides in the free thinking of the reader/author, and (4) it is genuinely free, not connected with the exigencies of life. 17 In terms of content, beyond the exploration of what could be an initial postulate or theorem, Fichte's real effort in this manuscript is to intuitively develop what is meant by agility.
As in the 1797/98 Attempt, agility is the experienced response to a command from without, a wrenching away from repose-something that is novel, situational, experienced, and of finite duration. Mental life is intellect's commutation between pervasive passive states (concept) and freely initiated activity (intuition).
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The most striking feature of this manuscript is Fichte's self-questioning, his struggle to put the actual experience of freedom (in Kant's sense of starting something new) into words.
What the 'first postulate' or the first free response to command shows is not even a subject, but a 9 pure reflex of consciousness that only appears to be a reflex from the point of view of something posited later and governed by it-a formal rather than a material I, one that is at once particular and universal, eternal, invariable, permanent, and ingredient in all states of consciousness. 19 The situation of being between action and repose--of being able to further determine one's determinability--is the I's ambiguous situation of being activity against a background of already determined being or repose: being mere faculty. The contrast is understood only to the extent it is experienced, and the activity is said to "create itself out of nothing." 20 Fichte employs the dialogue form in the Crystal Clear Report, which lends a sort of elegance to the "Do I really understand this?" questioning interjected into the New Version. He again focuses on the parallel between the geometry and Wissenschaftslehre. Both sciences start from a point of self-evidence, for the geometer perhaps an angle formed by two lines, for the philosopher, the unity of consciousness given in all consciousness. In both cases, the startingpoint is highly abstract, but universally valid. The science proceeds in reason, and so each reader in fact constructs the point of evidence and everything that follows from it for herself (GA I/7:
229-33). Science describes a series of intuitions which are necessarily interconnected, so it is not a matter of describing actual figures or actual minds, or of finding the right words to communicate actual states of affairs; it is a matter of rational construction freely undertaken, a work of abstraction (GA I/7: 237-38).
If we bring these scattered remarks from 1800-1801 together we get an image of
Wissenscahftslehre as 'scientific' philosophy, rooted in the evident certainly of the I's own activity, accessible to non-scientists because they too can perform the experiment of freely thinking X, whose propositions or theorem are demonstrated because they are a progressive series of intuitions. The characteristic methodology of earlier versions need not be rejected;
instead they are brought forward and unified as construction in intellectual intuition.
II
We turn now to Schelling. We can also discern three phases in his thinking on transcendental method from 1799-1802/03. This is a more compressed time frame than in Fichte's case, but since for a good part of the time he is in intense discussions with Fichte, it is not surprising that he finally arrives at something like Fichte's understanding. What is problematic, however, is whether the words "construction in intellectual intuition" mean roughly the same thing when applied to transcendental philosophy and when applied to nature.
In the 1800 System of Transcendental Idealism, the method Schelling uses to ground and integrate the five epochs of consciousness 21 into one system is quite complicated. In preliminary reflections on methodology, one can see a 'synthetic' method that parallels Fichte's overall procedure in the Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre: the final synthesis is present from the beginning for the philosopher who untangles the overall synthesis into a series of discrete analyses and partial synthetic reconstructions, and so produces a pragmatic history of consciousness.
There are no less than four sets of methodological reflections at the beginning of the work. (1.) An initial set of remarks ( § 1) consider philosophical cognition as 'bare knowing'.
Since philosophy is a knowing and knowing is an identification of opposites--knower and known, or the subjective and the objective--systematic philosophy must have two major parts, philosophy of nature and transcendental philosophy. In the first, objectivity predominates and the observing philosopher recounts the emergence of intelligence within nature; in the second, subjectivity predominates and the philosopher recounts the solidification of individual will into social, legal, political and historical totalities (HkA I/ 9, 1: 29-32). 22 -Fichte is highly critical of this beginning, for it sunders transcendental idealism into two equal but opposite accounts, and in fact prizes nature or preconscious activity over self-consciousness. It considers intelligence only in objectified form, whether that be nature, law or the object of theology. In doing so, it loses the warrant that intellectual intuition gives to idealism, the self-evident postulate that all states of consciousness bring with them and are founded on self-consciousness.
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(2.) A corollary set of remarks ( § 2) consider philosophy more specifically as 'transcendental knowing,' which is said to be an artifice (Kunst) put in place subsequent to a skeptical dissociation of consciousness and its supposedly external objects. While in the lifeworld all thinking, knowing and action are characterized by a disappearance of the subjective into the objective, transcendental knowing reverses the direction and displays all mental activities as the self-objectification of the primordially subjective (HkA I/9, 1: 35).
(3.) A section on the organ or instrument of transcendental philosophy ( § 4) underscores the fictional or imaginative aspect of the transcendental philosopher's procedure: if one is confined to the subjective or one's own activity, but there is no direct access to this activity, selfintuition must take the detoured route of production and reflection-intuition, with the former prior but hidden, and the latter always subsequent and after the fact. This imbalance persists throughout the whole series of deductions, until the perpetually hidden subjective element of productive intuition becomes its own object in aesthetic intuition. Only in the crafting of the work of art do production and intuition come to identity (HkA I/9,1: 40-42). A second moment in Schelling's evolution on transcendental method can be seen in his
General Deduction of the Dynamic Process, which appeared shortly before the System of Transcendental Idealism was published. Here Schelling speaks of the sole task of natural science as the "construction of matter," a task that can be accomplished only generally, not for each discrete appearance in nature. Since organic nature is but a higher level or potency of the inorganic, the construction of matter is at once the most basic and the most general task of a philosophy of nature. 26 The task involves the heuristic assumption that there is an ideal subject of nature in which is found a primordial opposition of forces, one of which is called 'expansive'
and signifies only a pure production which can never appear, the other called 'retarding' or 'attractive'; the latter is responsible for the introduction of duplicity, hence of the real production that results from the absolute opposition of these forces, or from their expression in opposite directions, denominated 'centrifugal' and 'centripetal'. All the specific levels of the dynamic process on the inorganic level-magnetism, electricity, and chemical interaction-can be viewed as but different functions of the universal endeavor to reduce the opposite factors to identity once more and reinstate original identity in place of the duplicity that underlies natural appearances. 27 Just as all the multiplicity of nature's inorganic products can be viewed as mixtures of these three basic processes, so all the phenomena of organic nature stem from mixtures of their organic correlates-sensibility, irritability and reproduction. These parallels were established in the System of Transcendental Idealism as phases in the history of self-consciousness, so that 14 Naturphilosophie serves not only as a redaction of the discovery of the natural sciences but as a "physicalistic explanation of idealism." 28 Schelling concludes this essay with some important methodological remarks. Humans are not pure spirits, and we can approach the truth of our own nature only by putting aside subjective views and learning to view ourselves purely theoretically, purely objectively. Nature serves as a transcendental reminder of the state in which we were one with nature, and so What characterizes an idea, as opposed to a concept that clearly retains connection to a reality external to the concept, is an immediate union of universality and particularity. 31 A fourth essay considers the depiction that an idea receives in absolute philosophy, where both universal and particular factors are reflected in each other in something akin to an artistic creation. The product is a 'construction', what produces it is 'intellectual intuition', and when the process is carried through to systematic totality it is called 'demonstration'. 32 The idea constructed in intellectual intuition, the plant the botanist studies or the animal the zoologist comes to know, is the universe in particular form. When it needs to be displayed in discursive form, this same idea is the connecting thread or the principle of demonstration.
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Demonstration will serve as a label for this third phase of methodological reflection.
What remains is to explicitly contrast the views of Fichte and Schelling, especially in their most developed phases.
III
Let us look back. With Fichte, we had the phases of postulation, intellectual intuition, and finally construction in intellectual intuition. With Schelling, we had those of hypotheticaldeductive process, construction, and demonstration, the last of which is virtually the same as Both our philosophers agree that imaginative projection-or fiction, to put it bluntly-is at the heart of the enterprise of building a philosophical system. In November of 1800, Fichte writes:
The reality of nature is different again. The latter appears in transcendental philosophy as something thoroughly found. . . . Science only makes nature into its object through a subtle abstraction and obviously has to posit nature as something absolute (precisely because it abstracts from the intelligence), and lets nature construct itself by means of a fiction, just as transcendental philosophy lets consciousness construct itself by means of an equivalent fiction. 34 While he will not agree that nature is something purely found, Schelling agrees that its construction (or reconstruction) in philosophy has the nature of fiction:
But if you were to . . . then say that the philosophy which I call purely theoretical is precisely the science you speak of in your letter, namely, one which would make nature alone its object through a free abstraction , and then permit it to construct itself through a (justifiable) fiction, this is entirely and absolutely my view. . . .
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The whole difference between our two philosophers lies in the proximity or remoteness of the transcendental subject from the empirical self that is abstracted from. Schelling is aware that he has a problem when he speaks in 1802 of the difference between the apparent vacuity of the "night absolute" and the fullness of the "day absolute" and contrasts the two in theological terms 19 as the still and immutable eternal Father and the Son who steps forth in his own shape as living wisdom. 36 In a footnote that summarized the first set of 1802 essays that is prefaced to the second set, Schelling speaks of the absolute's substance essence (the "night absolute") in this way:
. . .
[T]he absolute is determined as that which is intrinsically neither thought nor being, but which, for that very reason, is absolute. Since reason is challenged to conceive the absolute neither as thought nor as being but still to think it, a contradiction arises for reflection, since for it everything is either a case of being or one of being. But intellectual intuition enters even into the contradiction and produces the absolute. In this breakthrough lies the luminous point where the absolute is positively intuited.
(Intellectual intuition is therefore merely negative within reflection.) Through this positive intuition, philosophical construction as such is first made possible, or exhibition in the absolute which is the same thing. 37 What is lacking is an ample treatment of reason and reflection, or of 'negative' and 'positive' intellectual intuition. That task awaits Hegel's pen.
